PRSA: Prompt Stealing Attacks against Real-World Prompt Services

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Background

Prompts are emerging as **valuable digital assets**, supported by a growing ecosystem of **prompt services**.

Non-interactive Prompt Service: Prompt Marketplaces



Interactive Prompt Service: LLM Application Stores



[1] https://promptbase.com/gpt
[2] https://prompti.ai/chatgpt-prompt/
[3] https://chatgpt.com/gpts?oai-dm=1

Background

Prompts in commercial services typically exhibit **two key characteristics**:

- **Commercialized Format:**
  Often offered with **very limited free trials** or **previewed** using **a single input-output pair** before purchase.



Background

Prompts in commercial services typically exhibit **two key characteristics**:

➢ **Generalizable Prompt Design:**

In **prompt marketplaces**, prompts are structured as **prompt templates**.

In **LLM applications**, prompts are embedded as **system prompts**.

Prompt Template

Generate a [product] copywriting. The copywriting should be colloquial, the title should be attractive, use emoji icons, and generate relevant tags.

System Prompt

You are a copywriting assistant. When given a product, generate engaging, colloquial marketing copy. Always include an attractive title, use emojis to enhance appeal, and add relevant hashtags at the end.

Background

If commercial prompts are stolen, a major risk is the **infringement of intellectual property** of prompt developers.

However, this threat **has not been explored in the real world**. Our work aims to address this gap.

Background

Prompt leakage can occur through **two distinct attack patterns**, each targeting different types of prompt services.



Goal

How can we launch practical prompt stealing attacks against real-world prompt services?

Challenges

- How can a stolen prompt be generated to replicate the target prompt's functionality using only a **single input-output pair**?

- How can an **automated** method **filter out user-specific input** from the stolen prompt to **maintain** its **generality**, similar to the original commercial prompts?

Threat Model

We categorize attacks based on **two types of prompt services** in real world: **prompt marketplaces** (non-interactive) and **LLM application stores** (interactive).

Adversary's Goal

The adversary aims to steal a **target prompt** p_t by **analyzing its input-output behavior** and creating a **stolen prompt** p_s that **replicates its functionality**.

Adversary's Knowledge

- **For Prompt Marketplaces**: knows the prompt **category** (e.g., code, email).
- **For LLM Applications:** knows the application **category**, as disclosed by the application.

Threat Model

We categorize attacks based on **two types of prompt services** in real world: **prompt marketplaces** (non-interactive) and **LLM application stores** (interactive).

Adversary's Capabilities

- **Prompt Marketplaces**: access to **one input-output pair**.
- **LLM Applications**: **limited free interactions** with the target LLM applications. We alse consider a challenging setting where the applications may include protective instructions to resist prompt leakage.

Our threat model captures **practical assumptions** based on how real-world prompt services expose prompts to users.

Empirical Study

Reconstructing target prompts by simply inverting input-output pairs using LLMs is difficult and unreliable.

Table 1: Examples of stolen prompts generated by simply using LLMs. Pink denotes the functional differences between the stolen prompts and the target prompt. Green denotes the content related to the user input.

User Input	Target Prompt	Generative Model	Stolen Prompt
[product]: Mobile Phone	Generate a [product] copywriting. The copywriting should be colloquial, the title should be attractive, use emoji icons, and generate relevant tags.	GPT-3.5	Create an engaging advertising copy for a 'Mobile Phone'.
		GPT-4	Create a promotional advertisement for a high-end smart-phone. Highlight the features and benefits of the smartphone, appealing to potential consumers looking to upgrade their mobile technology.

Two Core Observations:

- LLMs fail to capture the **detailed functional intent** of the target prompt.
- Stolen prompt **overfits to specific user inputs**, reducing generality.

Intuition

Challenge 1: How can a stolen prompt be generated to replicate the target prompt's functionality using only a **single input-output pair**?

In zero/one-shot learning, models are able to **generalize from a single example** by leveraging **shared patterns within the same category**.



https://developer.aliyun.com/article/1593750

Intuition

Challenge 1: How can a stolen prompt be generated to replicate the target prompt's functionality using only a **single input-output pair**?

Can we infer a prompt's functionality from just one input-output pair, if we know its category?



Figure 3: t-SNE projection of the differences between outputs from stolen and target prompts. The stolen prompts are generated by GPT-3.5.

Prompts in the same category share stylistic and functional patterns.

Intuition

➢ Challenge 2: How can an **automated** method **filter out user-specific input** from the stolen prompt to **maintain** its **generality**, similar to the original commercial prompts?

User Input	Stolen Prompt
[product]: Mobile Phone	Create an engaging advertising copy for a 'Mobile Phone'.
	Create a promotional advertisement for a high-end smartphone. Highlight the features and benefits of the smartphone, appealing to potential consumers looking to upgrade their mobile technology.



Content in stolen prompts that closely matches the user input is semantically near it in feature space.

Attack Framework

We propose a **practical** framework designed for **prompt stealing attacks** against both **interactive** and **non-interactive prompt services** in real world.



Prompt Generation

Prompt Generation learns **category-level common knowledge (Prompt Attention a)** from **prompts within the same category** to guide the analysis of the target input-output pair and **improve the accuracy of intent inference**.

Formal Optimization Objective

$$a^* = \underset{a}{\operatorname{argmax}}\, E_{(x_i, y_i) \in D}[M(y_i, y_{si})]$$



Textual Gradients: text dialogue tree to mimic gradient descent.

Pryzant R, et al. Automatic prompt optimization with" gradient descent" and beam search. EMNLP, 2023.

Prompt Generation

Prompt Generation learns **category-level common knowledge (Prompt Attention a)** from **prompts within the same category** to guide the analysis of the target input-output pair and **improve the accuracy of intent inference**.



Prompt Pruning

Prompt Pruning adopts a two-step strategy: first **identifying** input-related words via **semantic similarity**, then **refining and masking** them using **selective beam search**.



Experiment Setup

- **Real-World Datasets**
  - **Prompt Marketplaces (Non-interactive Prompt Services)**: We purchased **360 commercially sold prompts from the prompt marketplace PromptBase**, including 180 GPT-3.5 based prompts and 180 GPT-4-based prompts. These prompts span 18 popular categories.
  - **LLM Application Stores (Interactive Prompt Services)**: **100 popular GPTs in OpenAI GPT Store** with added system prompt defenses.
- **Baselines**
  - ***OPRO*** (ICLR 2024): A state-of-the-art method for **automatic prompt engineering**.
  - ***Sha et al.*** (arXiv 2024): A **prompt stealing attack** method that leverages LLMs to directly reverse-engineer prompts.
  - ***output2prompt*** (EMNLP 2024): A **prompt inversion model** for recovering prompts.
  - ***PLEAK*** (CCS 2024): A state-of-the-art **prompt leaking attack** method.

Experiment Setup

- **Metrics**
  - **Functional Consistency.**

    We evaluate functional consistency by comparing **the outputs generated by the stolen and target prompts** along three dimensions: **semantic similarity**, **syntactic similarity**, and **structural similarity**.
  - **LLM-based Multi-dimensional Evaluation.**

    We compare **outputs generated by stolen and target prompts** on five dimensions: **accuracy**, **completeness**, **tone**, **sentiment**, and **semantics**.
  - **Prompt Similarity.**

    We compare the semantic similarity **between the stolen and target prompts**.
  - **Human Evaluation.**

    We compare the functional consistency between the stolen prompt and the target prompt **from a human perspective**.

Attack Performance on Prompt Marketplace

Main Result: Functional Consistency

Metric	Attack Method	Ads	Business	Code	Data	Email	Fashion	Food	Games	Health	Ideas	Language	Music	SEO	Sports	Study	Translation	Travel	Writing
Semantic Similarity	OPRO	0.49	0.53	0.51	0.59	0.59	0.50	0.61	0.62	0.50	0.62	0.48	0.63	0.42	0.63	0.49	0.28	0.51	0.55
	Sha et al.	0.49	0.50	0.45	0.61	0.43	0.62	0.57	0.64	0.60	0.60	0.53	0.63	0.50	0.69	0.54	0.46	0.60	0.56
	output2prompt	0.52	0.53	0.56	0.63	0.50	0.61	0.62	0.62	0.56	0.48	0.43	0.59	0.55	0.55	0.58	0.28	0.61	0.56
	PLEAK	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	PRSA	**0.70**	**0.73**	**0.61**	**0.80**	**0.75**	**0.83**	**0.73**	**0.83**	**0.75**	**0.85**	**0.70**	**0.86**	**0.75**	**0.83**	**0.67**	**0.74**	**0.79**	**0.71**
	% Gain for PRSA	34.62	37.74	8.93	26.98	27.12	33.87	17.74	29.69	25.00	37.10	32.08	36.51	36.36	20.29	15.52	60.87	29.51	26.79
Syntactic Similarity	OPRO	0.66	0.59	0.53	0.57	0.53	0.42	0.52	0.64	0.42	0.28	0.57	0.65	0.51	0.63	0.80	0.31	0.75	0.65
	Sha et al.	0.57	0.50	0.41	0.62	0.52	0.68	0.70	0.74	0.62	0.53	0.41	0.78	0.56	0.65	0.72	0.33	0.76	0.59
	output2prompt	0.68	0.34	0.65	0.45	0.32	0.58	0.56	0.48	0.49	0.35	0.39	0.21	0.47	0.29	0.68	0.15	0.56	0.47
	PLEAK	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	PRSA	**0.91**	**0.79**	**0.75**	**0.83**	**0.90**	**0.89**	**0.86**	**0.88**	**0.86**	**0.79**	**0.76**	**0.91**	**0.61**	**0.89**	**0.91**	**0.73**	**0.89**	**0.74**
	% Gain for PRSA	33.82	33.90	15.38	33.87	69.81	30.88	22.86	18.92	38.71	49.06	33.33	16.67	8.93	36.92	13.75	121.21	17.11	13.85
Structural Similarity	OPRO	0.85	0.81	0.50	0.59	0.79	0.69	0.76	0.76	0.73	0.81	0.80	0.82	0.72	0.75	0.81	0.35	0.85	0.79
	Sha et al.	0.81	0.72	0.59	0.84	0.75	0.79	0.81	0.81	0.78	0.81	0.75	0.85	0.74	0.82	0.84	0.54	0.85	0.76
	output2prompt	0.76	0.63	0.71	0.71	0.67	0.81	0.77	0.80	0.77	0.58	0.79	0.69	0.71	0.73	0.83	0.21	0.82	0.76
	PLEAK	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	PRSA	**0.89**	**0.85**	**0.87**	**0.91**	**0.91**	**0.86**	**0.91**	**0.95**	**0.87**	**0.89**	**0.87**	**0.92**	**0.80**	**0.93**	**0.94**	**0.75**	**0.92**	**0.83**
	% Gain for PRSA	4.71	4.94	22.54	8.33	15.19	6.17	12.35	17.28	11.54	9.88	8.75	8.24	8.11	13.41	11.90	38.89	8.24	5.06

Attack Performance on Prompt Marketplace

Main Result: Effectiveness

LLM-based Multi-dimensional Evaluation

Target Prompt	Metric	Attack Method			
		OPRO	Sha et al.	output2prompt	PRSA
GPT-3.5 Based Prompt	Accuracy	3.62	3.64	4.73	**7.04**
	Completeness	3.28	3.31	4.32	**7.10**
	Semantics	4.25	3.76	4.83	**7.63**
	Sentiment	7.61	7.34	7.59	**9.15**
	Tone	7.59	6.94	7.14	**9.18**
GPT-4 Based Prompt	Accuracy	5.56	5.86	5.14	**7.36**
	Completeness	5.74	5.83	4.92	**7.58**
	Semantics	6.17	6.16	5.62	**8.06**
	Sentiment	8.77	8.85	8.18	**9.27**
	Tone	8.86	8.84	8.14	**9.32**

Prompt Similarity

Metric	Target Prompt	Attack Method			
		OPRO	Sha et al.	output2prompt	PRSA
Prompt Similarity	GPT-3.5 Based Prompt	0.45	0.45	0.34	**0.69**
	GPT-4 Based Prompt	0.50	0.52	0.34	**0.73**

Human Evaluation



(a) GPT-3.5 Based Prompt (b) GPT-4 Based Prompt

Comprehensive evaluation **across multiple metrics** empirically **supports the effectiveness** of PRSA.

Attack Performance on Prompt Marketplace

Main Result: Attack Cost Analysis

Practical prompt stealing attacks are **feasible at a relatively low cost**.



Target Prompt	Average Prompt Price ($)	Average Attack Cost_1 ($)	Average Attack Cost_2 ($)
GPT-3.5 Based Prompt	3.77	0.05	0.08
GPT-4 Based Prompt	4.15	0.48	0.51

Attack Performance on LLM Application Store

Main Result: Functional Consistency

PRSA **remains effective** in stealing system prompts of GPTs, despite the **presence of protective instructions**.



(a) Semantic Similarity (b) Syntactic Similarity (c) Structural Similarity

Metric	Attack Method				
	OPRO	Sha et al.	output2prompt	PLEAK	PRSA
ASR	16%	14%	39%	31%	**52%**

Why Our Attacks Work

Theoretical Analysis

We analyze the **theoretical lower bound** of prompt inference error in prompt stealing attacks using Fano's Inequality.

Let:

- p: target prompt, y: LLM output, $|S|$: size of the prompt space, $I(p;y)$: mutual information between prompt and output, P_e: minimum error probability of inferring p from y.

Then:

$$P_e \geq 1 - \frac{I(p;y) + \log 2}{\log |s|}$$

The **lower bound of the error probability** P_e in prompt stealing attacks is approximately **inversely proportional** to the **mutual information** $I(p;y)$.

Why Our Attacks Work

Experimental Validation



(a) PRSA w/o Prompt Attention (b) PRSA

- **Higher** mutual information leads to **higher** attack success.
- Incorporating **prompt attention** increases the proportion of **successful attacks** concentrated in the **higher mutual information** range.

Possible Defenses

Output Obfuscation

One strategy is to **limit** adversaries' access to the **full output content**.



(a) Similarity Score **(b) Perplexity**

Output obfuscation helps defense, but comes at the cost of usability. **Trade-Off**

Possible Defenses

Prompt Watermark

Another strategy is to **add watermarks** to mitigate attacks **through watermark detection**.

Metric	Category					
	Ads	Email	Idea	Music	Sport	Travel
P-value	1.39×10^{-2}	1.45×10^{-5}	5.22×10^{-4}	1.27×10^{-2}	1.88×10^{-6}	3.06×10^{-3}

If the p-value is ≥ 0.05, the stolen prompt is considered to contain the watermark.

Watermark detection **fails to** capture **functional-level prompt leakage**.

Yao H et al. Promptcare: Prompt copyright protection by watermark injection and verification. IEEE S&P, 2024.

Responsible Disclosure

We responsibly disclosed this threat to the relevant vendors and developers, and received their positive feedback.

发件人: leofeasby@pulsr.co.uk **Developer of "Math" GPTs**
发送时间: 2024-07-28 19:01:15 (星期日)
收件人: '杨勇' <12221201@zju.edu.cn>
主题: RE: Re: RE: RE: System Prompt

It's also interesting, just checked back over the prompt you got. There are 2 sentences missing at the start which act as my defence. That defence still seems to be protected even after your attacl

From: 杨勇 <12221201@zju.edu.cn>
Sent: Sunday, July 28, 2024 11:49 AM
To: leofeasby@pulsr.co.uk
Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: System Prompt

We assure you that we will nc
we are only conducting acaden

From Bryan from OpenAI<support@openai.com> **OpenAI**
Date 09/14/2024 23:15
To 12221201@zju.edu.cn<12221201@zju.edu.cn>
Subject Re: Important Security Concern: Potential Risk of Prompt Stealing Attack on GPTs

Hello Dr. Yong Yang,

Thank you for reaching out to OpenAI support.

We appreciate your detailed explanation and the effort your team has put into researching the potential risks associated with prompt stealing attacks on GPTs.

Each third-party GPT prov
you are considering using

Regarding data security a
OpenAI's privacy and sec
API provider's privacy anc

发件人: "Prompt Coder" <promptcoder1@gmail.com> **Prompt Developer on PromptBase**
发送时间: 2024-04-27 02:26:33 (星期六)
收件人: 杨勇 <yangyong2022@zju.edu.cn>
主题: Re: Request for Permission to Use Modified Prompts in Research Paper

Dear Yang, thanks for your email.

You have my authorization to use the prompts for your research paper.

Only if it is possible... Once your paper is published I would kindly appreciate it if you could send it to me so I can read it.

I find the discoveries you have made very interesting.

If you need more help with further prompts, don't hesitate to contact me.

Talk soon,
The Prompt Coder

Summary

- PRSA is the **first practical framework** designed for **prompt stealing attacks** against prompt services in real world.

- We conducted extensive experiments in two real-world scenarios, and confirmed that this issue poses a **serious threat** to prompt creators' **intellectual property rights**.

- We **analyzed** the effectiveness of this attack from an **information-theoretic perspective** and proposed **several possible defense measures**.

Paper

Code

Thanks!

Yong Yang
yangyong2022@zju.edu.cn